and proposed a security dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environment using smart cards. They claimed that their protocol is efficient and can resist several kinds of known attacks. However, we observe that Lee et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to stolen smart card attack, malicious server attack. To remedy these security weaknesses, we propose an improved dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme which is immune to those attacks mentioned above. Besides, performance analysis shows that compared with other remote user authentication schemes, the proposed scheme possesses lower power consumption and lower computation cost. As a result, the proposed scheme seems to be more security and efficient, and more practical for users with portable mobile devices in multi-server environments.
INTRODUCTION
Remote user authentication is used for the remote server to verify the legitimacy of a remote login user over an insecure communication channel. With the rapid development of the Internet application and e-commerce technology, users are able to access the services with the portable mobile devices (smart card, PDA, note-book computer and so on) from any place at any time through the Internet. However, these conveniences will bring some security problems inevitably. Therefore, security such as user authentication is major worry in public network.
Password based authentication [1] [2] is one of the simplest and widely adopted mechanisms in network environments to authenticate a legitimate user. In 1981, Lamport [3] introduced first well-known remote password authentication scheme with password table. In the scheme, a password verification table must be stored in the server. It is susceptible to the risk of modifying the verification table and vulnerable to some attacks. Besides, this would also introduce the risk and cost of protecting and managing the verification table. Thus, in order to eliminate the security problem and improve cost and efficiency, in 2000, Hwang and Li [4] proposed a password authentication protocol without password table. Following the work of Hwang and Li, many remote user authentication schemes without password table have been proposed. But these conventional password authentication schemes were designed for the single-server environment.
In fact, with the fast development of the Internet application, many network environments have been becoming multi-server based. However, the multi-server environment requires that a user only registers once at the registration center and then he/she can use all the permitted services in remote servers [5] . Therefore, many dynamic IDbased remote user authentication schemes [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] have been proposed for multi-server environment.
In 2009, Liao and Wang [6] proposed a dynamic identity based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server architecture. They claimed that their protocol can resist various attacks and can achieve mutual authentication. However, Hsiang and Shih [7] pointed out that scheme [6] is vulnerable to insider attack, masquerade attack, stolen smart card attack, server spoofing attack, registration center spoofing attack and also fails to provide mutual authentication. To remedy these weaknesses, Hsiang and Shih proposed an improvement over scheme [6] . Nevertheless, in 2011, Lee et al. [8] pointed out that scheme [7] is susceptible to masquerade attack, server spoofing attack, moreover, it is not easily reparable and also cannot provide mutual authentication. For this, Lee et al. proposed an improved scheme based on scheme [7] and claimed that their scheme is more secure and efficient.
However, we find that Lee et al.'s scheme [8] still is vulnerable to stolen smart card attack, and malicious server attack. Therefore, in this paper, we propose an improved dynamic ID based remote user authentication with key agreement scheme for multi-server environment to solve the aforementioned security weaknesses. In our scheme, each server stores a unique secret number, and we employ the registration center ( RC ) to help the remote server authenticate login user. Our scheme can resist the possible attacks resulting from the multi-server environment. As a result, our proposed scheme can meet the requirements which is presented in [8] for the remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section Ⅱ, we present the cryptanalysis of Lee et al.'s scheme. The proposed improved scheme is provided in section Ⅲ. In section Ⅳ, we show the corresponding analysis about security and performance. Finally, conclusion is given in sectionⅤ. In this section, we analyze the security flaws of scheme [8] . The details of Lee et al.'s scheme can refer to [8] . We find that their scheme cannot resist stolen smart card attack, malicious server attack. The details are shown as follows.
The notations used through this paper are summarized in TableⅠ.
A. Stolen smart card attack
Suppose that an adversary Z steals the user i U 's smart card, he/she can extract the information { , , , , ( ), ( )} the user i U in a public networks was also intercepted by the adversary Z , the adversary Z can compute ( ( ) || || )
Then the Z can impersonate the user i U to login to the server j S . The Z generates a random number z N , and computes
Then, Z sends the forged login request message by j S successfully in step V4. Therefore, the adversary Z can fool the server j S into believing that he/she is a legitimate user. The scheme [8] cannot resist the stolen smart card attack.
B. Malicious server attack
In [8] , all the servers share exactly two same secret value ( || ) h x y and ( ) h y . When user i U logins to the server, each server has the ability to operate request message { , , , } i i j i i CID P Q N into follow formula: to access the service provided by the server j+1 S . Thus, scheme [8] is vulnerable to the malicious server attack.
III. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we propose an improved dynamic ID based remote user authentication with key agreement scheme for multi-server environment which not only remedies the security weaknesses existing in scheme [8] but also achieves more secure and efficient features. Our scheme involves three entities: the user ( i U ), the server ( j S ), and the registration center ( RC ). We assume that RC is to be trustworthy. RC chooses the master secret key x and secret number y , and then computers ( || ) j h SID y and shares it with j S in secure channel. Our scheme has four phases: registration phase, login phase, authentication and session key agreement phase, and password change phase. Registration Phase:
Step R1: : , Step R2:
V B H h h y ⋅ into a smart card, and issues it to the user i U via a secure channel.
Step R4: User i U enters b into the smart card. Finally, the smart card contains{ , , , , ( ), ( )}
Step L1: i U inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader, and inputs his/her i ID and i PW . Then the smart card computes ( )
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, and checks whether
If they are equal, smart card proceeds to the next step.
Step L2: Smart card generates a nonce i N and computes ( || ( )|| ) CID P C N to the server j S over a public channel.
Authentication and Session Key Agreement Phase:
Step A1: After receiving the login request message Step A2: On receiving the login request message from the server j S , RC computes ( || )
and 0 ( || || || )
Next, RC compares 0 C with the received 0 C , checks whether they are equal. If they are equal, RC authenticates the legitimacy of user i U successfully, and further generates nonce rj N and computes 1 ( || ( || )|| )
Step A3: When receiving message 1 
Step A4: Upon receiving the message{ , } 
IV. ANALYSIS OF OUR SCHEME

A. Security analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the security features of our proposed scheme on various known cryptographic attacks and then Table Ⅱ shows a comparison of the proposed scheme and other relevant schemes [7] [8] [9] about security. It demonstrates that our scheme is more secure than other related schemes.
1) Malicious user attack
In our design, the malicious privileged user z U knows the secret value ( ) h y shared by each user in their smart card. In addition, he/she can also intercept login message h T E ||N and ( || ) h y x . Therefore, our scheme can resist the malicious user attack.
2) Malicious server attack In our protocol, the trusted third party RC is employed to help the server authenticate the remote user. As a result, the server cannot compute any secret information about user without knowing ( ) h y and ( || ) h y x . Therefore, the malicious privileged server cannot masquerade any user to generate valid authentication message 0 ( || || || )
This can avoid the malicious server attack. 
, since he/she has no way to get the valid i T . Therefore, the attacker cannot send a forged login request to cheat the server. Our protocol is secure against the stolen smart card attack.
4) Server spoofing attack
In our scheme, each server stores a unique secret number ( || ) h T E N in step A3, then he/she can also not compute the correct response authentication message ( ( || ) || || )
. Therefore, our scheme is secure against the server spoofing attack.
B. Performance analysis
This subsection compares the performance of our proposed scheme with the related schemes [7] [8] [9] and evaluates our scheme. In our scheme, we only use the oneway hash function and exclusive-OR operations to finish the entire login and authentication phases. To analyze the computational complexity of the protocols, we define the notation h T is the time for a one-hash function. Because exclusive-OR operation requires very few computations, it is usually negligible considering its computation cost [9] . Besides, the computation cost of user registration is a onetime task, therefore, we only talk about the cost in login and authentication phase. Table Ⅲ shows the comparison of our improved scheme and the related remote user authentication schemes [7] [8] [9] . Our protocol achieves proper balance between the security and performance. By comparing, we can conclude that our dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme is more suitable for using in the future.
V. CONCLUSION In this paper, we proposed an improved dynamic ID based remote user authentication with key agreement scheme for multi-server environment upon finding some certain weaknesses in Lee et al.'s scheme. We find Lee et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to stolen smart card attack, malicious server attack. However, our improved scheme can withstand various known cryptosystem attacks and we adopt the random nonce instead of the timestamps to prevent the replay attack and avoid the difficulty and cost of implementing clock synchronization. Then by the security and performance comparison, we demonstrate that our proposed scheme is more suitable in the real-life.
